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INTRODUCTION 
No one has a constitutional right to fund terrorism,1 but American 
courts have long recognized and protected the constitutional right to 
due process,2 even in the face of accusations of dire wrongdoing.3  
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), an 
                                                          
 1. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft (Holy Land II), 333 F.3d 
156, 159, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reviewing First and Fifth Amendment challenges to 
organization’s designation as “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” and blocking of 
assets). 
 2. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (describing due 
process as constraining governmental decisions that work deprivations of 
constitutionally-recognized liberty or property interests); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (establishing that due process requires opportunity to be heard 
in a meaningful time and a meaningful manner); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 167 (1951) (recognizing the right to be heard before 
suffering a loss as a “principle basic to our society”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
68–69 (1932) (asserting that the right to a hearing includes the right to the aid of 
counsel when requested). 
 3. See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (charging defendants with rape); Nat’l Council 
of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 195–96 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(designating organizations as foreign terrorists). 
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increasing number of domestically-operated charitable organizations4 
have been accused of the grave offense of funding terrorism.5  Such 
an accusation carries serious consequences that correspond to the 
serious nature of the offense and can take effect as soon as the 
government begins investigating an organization.6  These 
investigations can result in swiftly imposed economic sanctions7 that 
freeze all of an organization’s assets, usually without notice.8 
Investigating and sanctioning organizations suspected of terrorism 
fundraising are tools in the post-9/11 “War on Terror”9 that are 
designed to identify and incapacitate any organization or individual 
who provides financial support to terrorists.10  President Bush 
spearheaded this effort on September 23, 2001, when he issued 
Executive Order 13,224,11 which declared a national emergency.  In 
response to this emergency, President Bush authorized the Secretary 
                                                          
 4. See Montgomery E. Engel, Note, Donating “Blood Money”:  Fundraising for 
International Terrorism by United States Charities and the Government’s Effort to Constrict the 
Flow, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 251, 251–54 (2004) (introducing investigations 
of three Muslim charities); see also David Ashenfelter, A Supporter or Scapegoat?  A 
Detroiter Faces Terrorism Trial, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 13, 2007, at 1; Neil 
MacFarquhar, Muslim Group Stirs Suspicion; CAIR Denies Critics’ Claims It’s a Front for 
Terror Organizations, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 2007, at 4; Farah Stockman, Sri Lanka Official 
Accuses US Groups:  Says Charities Provided Aid to Tamil Tigers, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 
2007, at A3. 
 5. See Rudolph Lehrer, Comment, Unbalancing the Terrorists’ Checkbook:  Analysis 
of U.S. Policy in Its Economic War on International Terrorism, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
333, 334 (2002) (listing six government raids related to investigations of terrorism 
financing); see also supra text accompanying note 4. 
 6. See Peter L. Fitzgerald, “If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human Rights, They 
Could Never Get Away With This:”  Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions 
Programs, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 75–77 (1999) (quoting notice of OFAC designation 
and describing consequence as immediately putting organization out of business and 
prohibiting it from moving its property or accessing funds without OFAC 
permission); see also Pamela M. Keeney, Comment, Frozen Assets of Terrorists and 
Terrorist Supporters:  A Proposed Solution to the Creditor Collection Problem, 21 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 301, 302 (2004) (noting that asset freezes leave organizations unable 
to pay their debts, such as rent or credit card companies). 
 7. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 4, at 253–55 (introducing use of economic 
sanctions as one method of working to eliminate domestic fundraising for terrorism 
but suggesting that criminal prosecution is “key to a prospective strategy for 
preventing domestic fundraising for international terrorism”). 
 8. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 75 (quoting sanctions notice that 
demanded that the company close the premises and informed it that its assets were 
frozen, effective immediately). 
 9. See Lehrer, supra note 5, at 334–35 (describing Bush Administration as 
waging “economic war” on fundraisers for terrorist groups). 
 10. See Engel, supra note 4, at 256–58 (discussing Bush Administration efforts to 
implement policy that would allow the government to halt monetary transactions 
with suspected terrorists); Keeney, supra note 6, at 301 (“‘We will starve the terrorists 
of funding . . . and bring them to justice.’” (quoting President Bush, Remarks on 
United States Financial Sanctions Against Foreign Terrorists and Their Supporters 
and an Exchange with Reporters; Transcript, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1364 (Oct. 
1, 2001))). 
 11. 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
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of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Attorney General, to block the assets of any person listed in the 
Annex to Executive Order 13,224,12 any person later determined to 
have committed or to pose a risk of committing terrorism,13 and any 
person acting to support terrorism.14  Persons later identified as 
subject to the sanctions imposed by the order are designated as 
“Specially Designated Global Terrorists” (“SDGTs”).15 
Since 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department, mainly through the 
efforts of its Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”),16 has been 
responsible for substantially increasing the number of “persons” 
listed as SDGTs.17  As a result, scores of domestically-operated 
charitable organizations are unable to access their assets18 and 
conduct business transactions of any kind without special 
government-issued licenses.19  The Treasury may impose these 
                                                          
 12. Id. § 1(a). 
 13. Id. § 1(b). 
 14. Id. § 1(d).  Section 3(a) of the order defines “person” as “an individual or 
entity” and section 3(b) defines “entity” as a “partnership, association, corporation, 
or other organization, group or subgroup.”  Id. § 3(a)–(b). 
 15. 31 C.F.R. § 594.310 (2005) (classifying “any foreign person or person listed in 
the Annex or designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224” as an SDGT); see Exec. 
Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 § 1(b), (d)(i) (Sept. 23, 2001) (permitting, 
respectively, the designation of “foreign persons determined . . . to have committed, 
or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security 
of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy, of the United 
States,” and the designation of persons deemed “to assist in, sponsor, or provide 
financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or 
in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed in the Annex . . . or 
determined to be subject to this order”). 
 16. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) is a subdivision of the U.S. 
Treasury that is responsible for promulgating and enforcing economic sanctions 
stemming from foreign policy and national security interests.  See U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforce 
ment/ofac/mission.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
 17. See Lehrer, supra note 5, at 335 (describing the list as tripling in length since 
President Bush issued the order). 
 18. See Eric Broxmeyer, Note and Comment, The Problems of Security and Freedom:  
Procedural Due Process and The Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 439, 444 (2004) 
(explaining that OFAC can freeze any assets held in American financial institutions); 
Engel, supra note 4, at 251–54 (comparing government position that charitable 
organizations have supported terrorist activity with their funds with organizations’ 
position that they provide legitimate functions and are subject to sanctions based on 
questionable evidence); Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 79–80 (asserting that OFAC’s 
power to block assets is the most significant of the sanctions it imposes). 
 19. Executive Order 13,224 prohibits, unless allowed by a license issued pursuant 
to the order: 
[A]ny transaction or dealing by United States persons or within the United 
States in property or interests in property blocked . . . including but not 
limited to the making or receiving or any contribution of funds, goods, or
services to or for the benefit of those person listed in the Annex . . . or 
determined to be subject to this order. 
Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 § 2(a). 
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sanctions for an indefinite period of time20 and may even block an 
organization’s assets before its name has been officially added to the 
list.21  Although national security and combating terrorism are 
important government interests, the process of imposing these 
financial sanctions on such organizations raises serious civil rights 
issues.  One important issue relates to a sanctioned organization’s 
right to use frozen funds to pay an attorney to represent it when 
challenging OFAC sanctions.  OFAC’s current procedures permit an 
organization to apply for the release of funds to pay attorneys’ fees,22 
but they do not adequately protect the organization’s interest in 
obtaining legal representation because they fail to provide a hearing 
for the organization immediately after the freeze takes effect.23 
This Comment considers the due process issues associated with the 
practice of freezing and regulating the release of the assets of 
domestic charitable organizations.  Part I examines the relevant laws 
that focus on preventing terrorism fundraising, including the 
Treasury licensing process for the limited release of frozen funds.  
Such laws typically provide for broad exercise of executive power—
justified by concerns about furthering foreign policy and national 
security goals. 
Part II surveys constitutional due process jurisprudence to establish 
what due process classes guarantee and then examines cases related 
to the use of financial sanctions and criminal forfeiture proceedings 
to determine what due process courts have required in these 
analogous situations.  Specifically, Part II focuses on what notice and 
hearing requirements due process imposes when individuals are 
subject to punitive financial actions that interfere with the right to 
obtain legal representation. 
Part III analyzes the due process afforded to organizations subject 
to financial sanctions and the Treasury licensing process.  The 
analysis compares the due process protections afforded to defendants 
in criminal forfeiture with those afforded to sanctioned organizations 
and determines that the government’s interest in furthering foreign 
policy and national security goals justifies some of the distinction 
between the procedural protections afforded in criminal forfeiture 
                                                          
 20. See Lehrer, supra note 5, at 335 (criticizing OFAC’s ability to keep assets 
restrained for indefinite periods of time as an unproven deterrent against terrorist 
activity). 
 21. See, e.g., Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill (Global Relief I), 207 F. Supp. 2d 
779, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (considering claims of organization where OFAC froze 
assets pending investigation), aff’d, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 22. 31 C.F.R. § 585.506 (2007). 
 23. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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and those afforded to sanctioned organizations.  However, the 
analysis also reveals the important common interests shared among 
individuals subject to criminal forfeiture proceedings, other acts of 
government deprivation, and economic sanctions.  The comparison 
of these interests and the procedures in place to protect them suggest 
that the government has too severely limited the due process 
afforded to sanctioned organizations seeking the release of funds to 
pay attorneys’ fees. 
Part IV recommends that the Treasury provide organizations 
subject to financial sanctions with a timely adversarial hearing as a 
matter of course in order to ensure the proper release of any funds 
necessary to pay attorneys’ fees, or alternatively, that OFAC 
automatically offer to release reasonable attorneys’ fees contingent 
on the sanctioned organization providing specific information about 
the costs and type of legal services provided.  Additionally, Part IV 
explores the possibility of imposing a higher standard of review for 
organizations that challenge an OFAC decision not to release 
attorneys’ fees. 
Part V argues that the current process of imposing financial 
sanctions on organizations, whether under investigation or already 
designated as terrorist organizations, impermissibly denies those 
organizations due process by depriving them of the assets necessary 
to hire an attorney without providing a meaningful hearing to justify 
preventing the use of assets to pay an attorney.  Finally, Part V 
concludes that due process requires OFAC to either provide 
sanctioned organizations with a timely adversarial administrative 
hearing to consider the release of frozen funds to pay attorneys’ fees 
or implement a process for automatically releasing funds for this 
same purpose. 
I. STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY FOR THE FREEZING 
AND LICENSING OF ASSETS 
A. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
For many years, the U.S. government has used economic sanctions 
to serve a number of foreign policy objectives.24  In 1977, Congress 
enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
                                                          
 24. See Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 89 & nn. 63–71 (discussing use of sanctions to 
oppose communism, the drug trade, and terrorism and to promote democracy and 
human rights). 
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(“IEEPA”)25 to amend the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) 
that Congress enacted in 1917.26  Both statutes give the President the 
authority to impose economic sanctions, but the IEEPA restricts the 
use of the TWEA to wartime only and provides a separate authority 
for the presidential use of economic sanctions during peacetime.27 
To invoke the authority granted under the IEEPA, the President 
must declare a national emergency,28 which requires a showing that 
an “unusual and extraordinary” threat to national security, foreign 
policy, or the U.S. economy exists wholly or substantially outside the 
United States.29  After satisfying these criteria, the President, or a 
designated agency, has the power to sanction foreign nations, 
organizations, or persons that are identified as contributing to the 
threat.30  The President may even impose sanctions on entities that 
are under investigation but have yet to be identified as threats.31  The 
                                                          
 25. Pub. L. No. 95-m223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1701–1717 (2000)). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 1–44 (2000)); see Stanley J. Marcuss, Grist for the Litigation Mill in U.S. Economic 
Sanctions Programs, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 501, 501–02 (1999) (explaining that, 
before the IEEPA, the TWEA authorized the President to regulate economic 
transactions involving property in which a foreign country or national had an interest 
during war and peacetime). 
 27. See Michael P. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and Retention of Counsel, 9 ADMIN. L.J. 
AM. U. 515, 532 (1995) (“[I]n less than twenty years, IEEPA has been invoked more 
often than TWEA has been in the almost eighty years since its enactment.”); see also 
Marcuss, supra note 26, at 502–03 (noting that after declaring a national emergency, 
the President can rely on the IEEPA to impose economic sanctions to address threats 
related to the emergency). 
 28. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2000); see JOHN ROTH ET AL., STAFF REPORT TO THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH 
ON TERRORIST FINANCING 76 (2004), available at http://www.911commission.gov/st 
aff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf (identifying the President’s declaration 
of a national emergency as the source of OFAC’s authority to impose sanctions). 
 29. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). 
 30. See generally Lehrer, supra note 5, at 336–40 (outlining process by which the 
President identifies entities with which financial transactions should be proscribed 
based on foreign policy and national security goals, and describing how OFAC 
imposes the sanctions). 
 31. See Engel, supra note 4, at 255 (referring to the government’s ability to block 
assets “pending investigation” as a new post-9/11 tactic).  The sanctions essentially 
give the President the power to control any property in which any sanctioned foreign 
entity has an interest.  Specifically, The IEEPA grants the President the power to: 
investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct 
and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, 
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or 
exportation of, or dealing in, orexercising any right, power, or privilege with 
respectto, or transactions involving, any property . . . . 
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2000).  This power extends to property within 
the United States and includes the ability to regulate the provision of legal services to 
an organization and an organization’s ability to pay for legal services.  See Holy Land 
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft (Holy Land II), 333 F.3d 159, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (rejecting interpretation of IEEPA as only contemplating the imposition of 
economic sanctions on legally enforceable interests in property and interpreting the 
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IEEPA provides the foundation for the designation and sanctioning 
of organizations, but Executive Order 13,22432 explicitly provides for 
the designation of SDGTs. 
B. The Administrative Authority for the Designation of Specially Designated 
Global Terrorists—Executive Order 13,224 
1. Designating specially designated global terrorists 
As discussed above, Executive Order 13,224 issued a list of SDGTs 
and provided for the future designation of additional SDGTs by 
authorizing the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to designate as an SDGT 
any individual or entity suspected of committing or supporting 
terrorist acts.33  The provision of Executive Order 13,224 that most 
often results in the designation of domestic charities is section 
1(d)(i), which authorizes the designation of any individual or entity 
determined to assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or 
technological support for terrorist acts or to any other SDGT.34  When 
adjudicating due process challenges to the designation process, 
courts have determined that OFAC may postpone notice and hearing 
until after the designation is issued and economic sanctions are in 
place because an important government interest—national security—
is at stake.35   
                                                                                                                                      
phrase “any interest” to include direct and indirect interests); see also Engel, supra 
note 4, at 251–52 (detailing raids and asset freezes of three charitable organizations 
in the United States); Malloy, supra note 27, at 538–40 (introducing two economic 
sanctions programs that regulated the provision of legal services to entities subject to 
sanctions issued under the IEEPA). 
 32. 66 Fed. Reg. 49,080 § 1(d) (Sept. 23, 2001). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id.  The level of evidence supporting SDGT designations may vary, and the 
exact criteria that the executive requires before issuing a designation or imposing 
sanctions during an investigation pending designation is uncertain because the 
executive has not issued detailed evidentiary requirements.  See Roth et al., supra note 
28, at 82–84 (noting that Treasury officials have admitted that immediately after 
9/11 the demand for numerous designations resulted in some designations with 
weak evidentiary bases).  This is unlike the practice in other countries where 
designations are considered judicial or quasi-judicial acts and where the accused 
organization would be permitted to confront the evidence against it and the 
evidentiary standard is at least that required for U.S. civil trials.  See id. at 84. 
 35. See Holy Land II, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77 (recognizing combating terrorism 
by cutting off its funding as an important government interest), aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 
(D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill (Global Relief II), 315 
F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (claiming that prior notice and a hearing would allow 
an organization to “spirit [its] assets out of the United States”). 
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2. Imposing economic sanctions 
Once the government has issued its designation or has decided to 
investigate an organization as a potential SDGT, the Treasury has the 
power to freeze that organization’s assets and prohibit it from 
engaging in any transactions.36  The majority of responsibility for 
implementing these sanctions is delegated to OFAC,37 which manages 
the prohibition of transactions with SDGTs and the freezing, or 
blocking, of assets.38  OFAC controls these organizations’ assets by 
collaborating with financial institutions.39  After OFAC determines 
that an organization will be subject to sanctions, it issues a notice to 
financial institutions of the designation or pending investigation that 
initiates the freezing of the organization’s assets.40 
Although delaying notification of an SDGT’s designation and asset 
freeze prevents such organizations from transferring assets prior to a 
freeze,41 it also takes organizations by surprise and leaves them unable 
to pay any outstanding debts, employee salaries, rent, or other 
necessities without obtaining prior OFAC authorization.42  The 
                                                          
 36. See Engel, supra note 4, at 256–58 (comparing Executive Order 13,224 to 
Executive Order 12,947 and noting that both orders authorize the blocking of funds 
and the regulation of contribution of funds, goods, or services to persons subject to 
the order). 
 37. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d at 159 (“In December 2001, OFAC . . . designated 
HLF as . . . an SDGT and blocked all of its assets.”); see also Havana Club Holding, 
S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that OFAC 
has considerable authority to regulate the transactions of sanctioned organizations 
and to authorize otherwise prohibited transactions); Lehrer, supra note 5, at 336 
(characterizing OFAC as responsible for carrying out the majority of the 
administrative work related to carrying out the Executive Order). 
 38. See Lehrer, supra note 5, at 337 (“[F]reezing occur[s] after OFAC has 
determined that:  (1) targeted nations and/or individuals have an interest in these 
assets, and (2) these assets are subject to U.S. jurisdiction, or are in the possession or 
control of U.S. persons.”); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 79–80 n.26 (observing 
that OFAC uses the terms freezing and blocking interchangeably but does not clearly 
define either term). 
 39. See 31 C.F.R. § 597.201(a), (b) (2007) (explaining that once an organization 
is listed as a foreign terrorist organization in the Federal Registrar, any financial 
institution possessing or controlling the organization’s funds must “block all 
financial transactions” involving those assets, unless otherwise notified by the 
Secretary of the Treasury). 
 40. See id.; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 115 (describing uncertainty created 
by OFAC’s slow implementation of new rules and regulations and OFAC’s exemption 
from the prior notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act). 
 41. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (denying 
prior notice of designation and of freezing of assets to protect effectiveness of the 
order); Global Relief I, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (describing 
notification of designation and restraint of assets as simultaneous), aff’d, 315 F.3d 748 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
 42. See Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 75-77 (quoting notice to designated 
organization that immediately seized all of the organization’s property and froze all 
of its assets, essentially putting it out of business); Keeney, supra note 6, at 302-03 
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sanctions also regulate non-monetary transactions, such as consulting 
an attorney, by prohibiting payment to attorneys without first 
obtaining a license to do so.43 
To obtain permission to access frozen funds or to pay for the 
services of an attorney, a sanctioned organization may apply to OFAC 
for licenses.44  If OFAC denies an organization’s license application, 
the organization may request an explanation in writing or in person, 
but OFAC does not automatically provide one.45  The organization 
may then challenge the denial in court, but the chances of success 
are slim because a court may refuse to review the decision or,46 if a 
court reviews the decision, it will grant substantial deference to 
OFAC’s authority.47  Courts defer to SDGT designations as 
administrative decisions governed by the judicial review provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),48 which establish that 
OFAC’s actions may only be set aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with [the] 
                                                                                                                                      
(arguing that sanctions prevent creditors from collecting debts); Lehrer, supra note 
5, at 347 (describing seizure of assets as sudden and potentially unconstitutional). 
 43. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.506 (2007) (authorizing provision of legal services to a 
SDGT as long as all payments to attorneys are licensed, and restricting payment to 
legal services provided by U.S. persons related to U.S. legal issues); see also Fitzgerald, 
supra note 6, at 111-16 (criticizing delay in OFAC’s publication of new rules and 
regulations, and noting that OFAC has no time limits on how long it may take to 
respond to a request for a license). 
 44. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801 (2007) (authorizing applications for general or 
specific licenses); 31 C.F.R. § 585.506 (requiring license approval before a SDGT may 
pay attorneys’ fees even out of unblocked assets).  The Code of Federal Regulations 
(“CFR”) lists the types of licenses that an organization may apply for and briefly 
explains the application procedures, but OFAC provides little meaningful 
information about what criteria must be met in order to receive a license.  See 31 
C.F.R. § 501.802 (2007) (stating that OFAC will inform applicants of its decision, 
which constitutes final agency action, but failing to include information as to how 
OFAC arrives at its decision); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 136 (criticizing 
OFAC’s failure to provide detailed information about how to challenge its actions 
and describing OFAC’s administrative practices as lackadaisical).  Essentially, to apply 
for a license to transfer funds for any reason, OFAC requires a SDGT to submit an 
application that includes detailed financial information and states the amount and 
the beneficiary of the transfer.  See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b)(2)–(3) (adding that OFAC 
may require applicants to supply additional information as necessary). 
 45. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b)(4) (permitting additional license applications if 
OFAC denies an organization’s application and its requests for OFAC’s explanation 
of denial). 
 46. See, e.g., Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498, 503 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (designating the OFAC licensing process as resting upon foreign 
policy considerations and judgments of the Executive Branch that the judiciary 
should not disturb), aff’d, 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 47. See, e.g., Milena Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Newcomb, 995 F.2d 620, 623–25 (5th Cir. 
1993) (deferring to OFAC judgment in determining that OFAC reasonably refused 
to lift a block on vessels seized pursuant to an executive order). 
 48. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). 
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law.”49  This standard presents a substantial obstacle for organizations 
challenging the adequacy of the procedural safeguards afforded by 
the sanctioning process.   
II. DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE 
Although the designation and economic sanctioning process that 
OFAC applies to SDGTs raises multiple constitutional concerns,50 this 
Comment focuses specifically on the due process issues associated 
with a sanctioned organization’s right to hire an attorney and 
examines whether the procedures in place adequately protect this 
right.51  Before determining what process is due to organizations 
subject to OFAC sanctions, a review of relevant due process 
jurisprudence related to the freezing of assets is necessary.  Because 
few cases address OFAC freezes under Executive Order 13,224, an 
examination of civil and criminal cases involving the freezing and 
forfeiture of assets under other laws provides a useful framework for 
comparison. 
A. Due Process:  Who, When, What, and How 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be “deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”52  However, in 
truth, the Fifth Amendment does not protect everyone who suffers an 
injury due to U.S. government action. 
1. Who can seek protection under the Due Process Clause 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process to every U.S. citizen 
and to foreign nationals who have significant ties to the United 
                                                          
 49. Id. § 706(2)(A); see Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 731 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (declining to “substitute [its] judgment for OFAC’s” and requiring 
only a rational connection between the facts OFAC presents and its decision), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 92 (2007); Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(acknowledging that actions related to the designation of terrorist organizations are 
subject to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A) (2000)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 50. See Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns:  The USA PATRIOT Act, Money 
Laundering, and the War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 959 (2003) 
(characterizing the power of Executive Order 13,224 as unconventional because its 
authority is based, in part, on the idea of guilt by association); Roth et al., supra note 
28, at 87–88 (questioning aggressive use of IEEPA to prosecute potential terrorism 
fundraisers because of civil liberties concerns). 
 51. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1006–07 (Aspen Publishers 
2002) (describing the difference between procedural and substantive due process by 
explaining that procedural due process requires certain safeguards to protect a 
specific right and that substantive due process demands sufficient justification for 
government deprivation). 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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States.53  In People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States 
Department of State,54 the court quickly dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
procedural due process challenges to their designations as foreign 
terrorist organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act55 because the plaintiffs did not have sufficient property or 
presence in the United States to establish significant ties to the 
United States.56  Therefore, the plaintiffs had no constitutional right 
to due process to protect them against government deprivation.57  
The first hurdle that an organization has to overcome when making a 
due process challenge is proving that it is subject to constitutional 
protection.  The next step is determining whether the government 
has done something to trigger due process protection and 
determining what protections due process provides. 
2. When due process applies and what due process guarantees 
Procedural due process imposes constraints on government actions 
that deprive individuals and organizations of liberty or property 
interests.58  Even a temporary deprivation of access to assets is subject 
to the constraints imposed by due process,59 and this temporary 
deprivation can result in a permanent deprivation of the right to a 
fair hearing if it impedes the ability to obtain legal representation.60 
                                                          
 53. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 
201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the National Council of Resistance of Iran 
had a presence and property within the United States, which brought it under the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t 
of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“A foreign entity without property or 
presence in this country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or 
otherwise.”). 
 54. 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000) (authorizing designations similar to those authorized 
under Executive Order 13,224). 
 56. People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22. 
 57. Id.; see Nat’l Council of Resistance, 251 F.3d at 201-03 (rejecting the 
government’s argument that an interest in a small bank account and an overt 
presence in the National Press Building in Washington, D.C., did not constitute 
substantial connections); see also People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22 (“No one would 
suppose that a foreign nation had a due process right to notice and a hearing before 
the Executive imposed an embargo on it for the purpose of coercing a change in 
policy.”). 
 58. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (acknowledging that 
continued receipt of Social Security benefits is a property interest protected by the 
Due Process clause). 
 59. See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing that restraining a defendant’s assets pending conviction is a deprivation 
subject to due process even though the nature of such restriction is “temporary and 
nonfinal” (citing N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84–86 (1972))). 
 60. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1970) (emphasizing that when 
the government takes action that results in injury to an individual, the right to be 
heard implies the right to be heard by counsel), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 601 
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Due process traditionally requires the government to provide an 
organization with notice and a hearing before the government 
deprives the organization of a property interest.61  The notice 
component of due process requires that injured parties have 
adequate information to understand and to defend against the 
charges they face.62  The hearing component of due process ensures 
fairness and protects against error by providing a forum for 
consideration of both parties’ evidence and arguments.63  Due 
process also requires that the government provide the hearing in a 
meaningful time and manner.64  Whether a defendant has received 
adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity for a hearing 
ultimately depends on the circumstances of the case.65 
3. How to determine what procedures the Constitution requires 
When evaluating a case to determine whether due process requires 
notice and a hearing prior to government deprivation, courts apply a 
                                                                                                                                      
(1996); Mosley v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) 
(recognizing that representation by counsel in civil or administrative matters is 
essential to due process and inherent in an adversarial system of justice). 
 61. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993) 
(explaining that precedent has established a general rule that individuals must have 
notice and hearing before the government deprives them of property); Mullane v. 
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (insisting that due 
process requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to government 
deprivation of property). 
 62. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985) 
(characterizing due process as necessary to ensure fairness and to guard against 
erroneous deprivation); James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 52 (citing Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972)) (recognizing that prior notice and a hearing are 
essential to ensure fair play and to prevent arbitrary or mistaken deprivations of 
property); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“No better instrument has been devised for 
arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it.”). 
 63. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 171–72 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (asserting that a one-sided determination of facts is unlikely to be fair); 
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1938) (“Those who are brought into 
contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of 
their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and 
to be heard upon its proposals . . . .”). 
 64. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); United States v. Moya-
Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 727 (7th Cir. 1988); see Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 
551–52 (1965) (concluding that a subsequent hearing was not meaningful where the 
defendant had to overcome a prior adverse ruling made while he was absent because 
he had not received timely notice). 
 65. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 320 (stating that the requirements of due process will 
vary based on the importance of the interest and the circumstances under which 
deprivation occurs); James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53 (weighing competing 
interests of the individual and the government to determine whether proceedings 
provide adequate due process); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 
416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974) (conceding that seizure of a property interest without prior 
notice or hearing is constitutionally permissible under limited circumstances). 
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three-part balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge.66  The test 
weighs:  (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation through the procedures used and the likely value of 
additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, 
which includes the function involved and any fiscal and 
administrative burdens that additional procedural safeguards would 
impose.67  The test has not led to the creation of bright-line rules for 
due process protections because it balances the competing interests 
involved and thus, requires case-by-case analysis of the facts.  
Therefore, conclusions about what due process a petitioner deserves 
depend on a comparison of multiple applications of the test. 
B. Survey of Due Process Prior Notice and Hearing Case Law 
Few cases challenging the procedures involved in foreign terrorist 
designations reach the issue of due process as related to access to 
attorneys’ fees.68  However, courts have considered such due process 
challenges in criminal cases involving the forfeiture and freezing of 
assets69 and in civil cases involving other forms of government-
wrought deprivation of private interests.70  These cases provide 
valuable guidance in a constitutional analysis of OFAC procedures 
because they consider private interests analogous to those of 
sanctioned organizations and discuss the procedures necessary to 
protect those interests. 
                                                          
 66. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); accord James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53-62 
(applying Mathews test to determine that seizure of real property requires prior 
notice and a hearing where the private interest at risk is important, and there is no 
countervailing government interest); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 
1193–1203 (2d Cir. 1991) (considering whether due process requires a pre-trial 
hearing after the government restrains assets based on the Mathews factors). 
 67. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that the analysis required to determine whether an organization is a 
terrorist threat to the United States is especially within the expertise of the Executive 
Branch); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is beyond the judicial function for a court to review foreign 
policy decisions of the Executive Branch.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1189–90 (reviewing the due process claims of 
appellant charged with RICO, narcotics, continuing criminal enterprise, and 
firearms violations); Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 715 (considering the due process claims 
of defendants charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine). 
 70. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1970) (holding that due 
process requires an evidentiary hearing and opportunity to confront witnesses before 
termination of welfare benefits and citing representation by counsel as the best way 
to safeguard the interests of the welfare recipient at such a hearing), superseded by 
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1996); Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 
866–67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that OFAC lacked the authority to interfere with 
the formation of the attorney-client relationship with a sanctioned organization in a 
civil matter by requiring advance government approval). 
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In cases in which challenges to the designation process have been 
specifically reviewed, courts have held that due process does not 
require that SDGTs designated under Executive Order 13,224 receive 
pre-designation notice and a hearing because before issuing the 
order, the President declared a national emergency that justified 
post-designation notice.71  Under these decisions, the courts have also 
held that due process does not require a post-designation adversarial 
hearing to consider the validity of the SDGT designation.72  Instead, 
the courts have concluded that as long as sanctioned organizations 
are permitted to submit written responses after receiving notice of 
their designations, due process is satisfied.73  However, due process 
challenges to the seizure of assets in criminal cases have emphasized 
the importance of an adversarial hearing. 
In criminal cases considering the forfeiture of assets or property, 
courts have based decisions about the timing of notice and a hearing 
on two main factors:  (1) the importance of the private interest at 
stake74 and (2) the risk that the property owner could prevent the 
government from seizing the property if the property owner had 
prior notice.75  The importance of the interest at stake depends on 
the historical importance of the property at issue76 as well as the likely 
                                                          
 71. Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 156, 163–64 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see Global Relief II, 315 
F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting charitable corporation’s claim that due 
process required pre-seizure notice and a hearing because the interest in preventing 
the use of assets from financing violent acts outweighed the risk of erroneous 
deprivation).  But see Nat’l Resistance Council of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 
192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that due process requires prior notice and a 
hearing before OFAC can impose sanctions on an organization pursuant to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act). 
 72. See, e.g., Holy Land II, 333 F.3d at 163–64 (determining that the Treasury 
satisfied due process by providing the Holy Land Foundation with notice of pending 
re-designation as a SDGT, thirty-one days to respond, and by considering the 
Foundation’s response before re-designation). 
 73. See id. at 164 (stating that the Holy Land Foundation “ha[d] no right” to 
procedures approximating a judicial trial or to review classified information that 
OFAC had presented for in camera and ex parte review). 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54 
(1993) (requiring pre-deprivation hearing where defendant’s home was the subject 
of forfeiture proceedings because deprivation of one’s home “gives the Government 
not only the right to prohibit sale, but also the right to evict occupants, to modify the 
property, to condition occupancy, to receive rents, and to supersede the owner in all 
rights pertaining to the use, possession, and enjoyment of the property”). 
 75. Compare id. at 62 (noting the low level of risk involved, where the property at 
issue was defendant’s home, because of the absence of any exigent circumstances—
such as the potential sale, destruction, or further use in illegal activities—that might 
justify postponing a hearing until after the deprivation), with Calero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678–79 (1974) (permitting post-seizure 
notice and hearing where the property at issue was a yacht that could be easily 
transported or destroyed to avoid government seizure). 
 76. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 53–54 (noting that one’s right to maintain 
control over his home is a private interest “of historic and continuing importance”). 
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consequences of deprivation of such an interest.77  The level of risk 
that a property owner would be able to prevent the government from 
seizing the property primarily depends on the nature of the 
property.78 
In cases where the property could easily be placed outside the 
government’s reach, postponing notice and a hearing is 
constitutionally permissible if:  (1) it is necessary to secure an 
important governmental or public interest, (2) prompt action is 
necessary, and (3) a narrowly-drawn statute closely controls the 
government’s discretion in exercising its seizure power.79  Although 
the timing of notice and a hearing are important elements of due 
process protection, courts are clearly flexible when it comes to 
demanding that the government provide pre-deprivation notice and 
a hearing.80  However, courts that allow post-deprivation notice and a 
hearing are likely to take this into consideration and impose 
additional procedural safeguards when determining what kind of 
hearing due process requires once the deprived individual receives 
notice.81 
                                                          
 77. See id. at 54 (considering the deprivation of the use and benefit of the value 
of one’s home to be a far greater deprivation than the loss of kitchen appliances and 
furniture, which was sufficient to warrant a pre-deprivation hearing in Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70–71 (1972)). 
 78. Compare id. (evaluating the government’s seizure of an immobile home), with 
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678–79 (reviewing the government’s seizure of a vessel 
capable of mobility and allegedly used to transport controlled substances). 
 79. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678 (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91).  Here, the 
government had important interests in preventing the continued use of the property 
for illicit activity, and in enforcing the criminal sanctions.  Prior notice could have 
subverted these interests by providing time for the claimants to relocate, destroy, or 
hide the yacht.  Id. at 679.  It is important to note that the statute in this case 
provided an immediate post-seizure hearing that allowed the property owners to 
challenge the seizure.  Id. at 665–68. 
 80. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985) 
(pointing out that due process is a “flexible concept” and that “the processes 
required by the [Due Process] Clause with respect to the termination of a protected 
interest will vary depending upon the importance attached to the interest and the 
particular circumstances under which the deprivation may occur”). 
 81. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679–80 (suggesting that postponement of notice 
and a hearing until after individuals have been deprived of their property is only 
constitutionally permissible in extraordinary circumstances).  But see Fuentes, 407 U.S. 
at 83–84 (“While the existence of . . . other, less effective, safeguards may be among 
the considerations that affect the form of hearing demanded by due process, they are 
far from enough by themselves to obviate the right to a prior hearing of some 
kind.”). 
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C. The Right to a Meaningful Hearing 
1. A meaningful hearing includes the right to hire an attorney 
Although the timing and form of a hearing may vary depending on 
the circumstances of the case,82 the hearing component of due 
process is always aimed at providing the injured party with an 
adequate opportunity to defend its rights.83  To this end, the courts 
have determined that due process guarantees the injured party’s 
right to hire an attorney to represent its interests at the hearing.84  
However, unlike a criminal defendant whose assets are frozen and 
who has a right to appointed counsel,85 an organization subject to 
OFAC sanctions has no right to appointed counsel because OFAC 
sanctions do not constitute criminal prosecution.86 
Without the right to appointed counsel, an organization subject to 
OFAC sanctions must rely on due process to guarantee its access to 
counsel as part of its right to a meaningful hearing.87  Few cases 
directly address access to counsel in administrative hearings, but 
many cases address the issue in criminal proceedings.  Although the 
two settings differ, representation by counsel serves similar interests 
in both, and examining both types of cases establishes how courts 
value these interests. 
                                                          
 82. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–67 (1970) (determining that a pre-
termination hearing of welfare benefits need not be judicial or quasi-judicial in 
form), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1996); see also Greene v. McElroy, 360 
U.S. 474, 497–98 (1959) (reasoning that an adversarial administrative hearing with 
the opportunity for cross-examination was the best way to protect the employee’s 
interests when the government decided to revoke a private employee’s security 
clearance based solely on factual determinations by an administrative agency). 
 83. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268–69 (stating that a written submission to a 
decision maker arguing against termination of welfare benefits did not adequately 
protect the recipient’s rights, and that the recipient should have been entitled to 
orally present his case). 
 84. See id. at 270 (asserting that the right to be heard in cases where the 
reasonableness of government action depends on findings of fact is meaningless 
without guaranteeing the deprived party the right to hire an attorney); see also Mosley 
v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) (finding that the 
presence of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Specialist during an 
administrative settlement proceeding did not eliminate the claimant’s need for 
access to retained counsel in an employment discrimination case). 
 85. See United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing 
United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984)) (acknowledging that the 
government must appoint counsel for a criminal defendant who is indigent as a 
result of a government restraint on his assets). 
 86. See Engel, supra note 4, at 254 (observing that OFAC sanctions are not 
criminal in nature, but some sanctions have preceded related criminal charges). 
 87. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“The right to be heard 
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard 
by counsel.”); Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 728–29 (noting that a meaningful opportunity 
to challenge complex criminal charges requires immediate assistance from counsel 
in order for legal counsel to benefit the defendant). 
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2. Access to counsel in administrative and criminal proceedings 
Even in administrative proceedings, courts have recognized the 
importance of legal representation as part of a meaningful hearing.  
For example, when OFAC tried to directly control a sanctioned 
organization’s access to counsel by requiring the organization apply 
for and receive approval for a license for legal representation, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals determined that OFAC had exceeded 
its authority.88  The court emphasized that attempts to deny a 
corporation access to counsel, even in civil matters, raised due 
process concerns.89 
Although the interests at stake in criminal proceedings differ from 
those at risk in a civil or administrative proceeding,90  discussions of 
access to counsel and its importance to due process can serve as 
guideposts for assessing the value of legal representation in other 
circumstances.91  For example, in criminal cases where defendants 
challenged ex parte proceedings that authorized the forfeiture of any 
funds allegedly obtained through criminal activities, courts have held 
that pre-trial, post-indictment restraint of a defendant’s assets without 
an immediate post-restraint hearing violated due process because it 
deprived a defendant of his right to counsel of choice as long as the 
defendant had no other assets with which he could hire an attorney.92 
Even though extraordinary circumstances justified the absence of 
pre-restraint hearings in these cases,93 the courts determined that a 
                                                          
 88. See Am. Airways Charters v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 866–67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(questioning whether OFAC’s authority under TWEA included the power to regulate 
the “bare formation of an attorney-client relationship”). 
 89. Accord Mosley, 634 F.2d at 945 (describing access to and representation by 
counsel as essential to effective protection of individual rights); see Am. Airways 
Charters, 746 F.2d at 872–73 (“[I]n our complex, highly adversarial legal system, an 
individual or entity may in fact be denied the most fundamental elements of justice 
without prompt access to counsel.”). 
 90. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 72 (reasoning that failure to appoint counsel for an 
indigent criminal defendant and convicting and sentencing the defendant to death 
would be the equivalent of judicial murder and in violation of due process). 
 91. Even though a criminal defendant has the right to appointed counsel when 
he cannot afford private counsel, the Seventh Circuit has noted that deprivation of a 
defendant’s assets that would otherwise be accessible to him can result in an artificial 
deprivation of his right to “join issue with the government as he chooses.”  Moya-
Gomez, 860 F.2d at 729. 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1191 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(reviewing the issue after the Supreme Court held in United States v. Monsanto, 491 
U.S. 600, 616 (1989), that the government may restrain a defendant’s property after 
the government, in a hearing, established that it had probable cause to believe the 
assets were subject to forfeiture); Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 715–16, 731 (considering a 
challenge to the Comprehensive Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 that 
allowed ex parte proceeding authorizing forfeiture of funds purportedly obtained 
through trafficking controlled substances). 
 93. See Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1192 (recognizing the important governmental 
interests in separating a criminal from “ill-gotten” gains, obtaining funds for 
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pretrial adversarial hearing was necessary to establish that the 
government had probable cause to believe that the defendant’s 
property was forfeitable.94  This conclusion was based on:  (1) a 
defendant’s significant liberty interest in using the restrained assets to 
obtain counsel of choice,95 (2) the inherent risk of erroneous 
deprivation when an ex parte proceeding restrains a defendant’s assets 
and the irreparable harm that results from depriving the defendant 
of assets needed to retain counsel,96 and (3) the negligible impact 
that a pretrial probable cause hearing would have on the 
government’s interest.97  The significance of the defendant’s interest 
in obtaining counsel is such that one court has held that if the 
government is unwilling to provide the necessary hearing, then the 
government must exempt reasonable attorneys’ fees from the frozen 
assets.98 
Based on the courts’ recognition of the importance of an 
individual’s private interest in hiring an attorney in the civil and 
criminal settings, the interest will carry significant weight when 
analyzing what due process should be provided to protect it.  
However, conclusions about the adequacy of the due process 
afforded to sanctioned organizations that seek to hire attorneys 
cannot be drawn without a further and more detailed discussion of 
these decisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
furtherance of law enforcement, permitting recovery of assets by rightful owners, and 
decreasing the economic power of organized crime and drug enterprises); Moya-
Gomez, 860 F.2d at 721–22 (admitting that failure of forfeiture statutes to prevent 
removal, transfer, or concealment of assets prior to government seizure is a serious 
problem). 
 94. Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1197; accord United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 805 
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that due process required a pre-trial adversarial hearing 
establishing probable cause as to the forfeitability of the defendant’s assets where the 
government restrained the assets two years before issuing an indictment for 
violations of illegal counterfeiting and trademark violations).  But see Caplin & 
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624–33 (1989) (determining that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend beyond the individual’s right 
to spend his own legitimate assets and does not guarantee a defendant the right to 
use proceeds from a crime to finance his defense). 
 95. See Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1197 (identifying a defendant’s “strong and 
legitimate” interest in a pre-trial hearing establishing probable cause before being 
deprived of counsel of choice due to pre-trial restraint of assets). 
 96. See id. at 1195–96 (emphasizing the value of the additional procedural 
safeguards that a pre-trial hearing would provide). 
 97. See id. at 1197–98 (allowing the government to conduct the pre-trial probable 
cause hearing without conforming to the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to 
prevent premature disclosure of its case). 
 98. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 731. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TREASURY ASSET 
BLOCKING AND LICENSING PROCEDURES BASED ON THE PROCEDURES’ 
EFFECT ON A SANCTIONED ORGANIZATION’S RIGHT TO HIRE AN 
ATTORNEY 
Sanctioned organizations are subject to government action at 
multiple stages of the designation process.  First, the government 
freezes an organization’s assets.  If an organization had notice of a 
pending freeze, it would be able to hire an attorney prior to the 
freeze without interference.  However, the analysis in Part A of this 
section demonstrates that other overriding interests justify 
postponing notice until after the freeze is in place. 
Second, after the government freezes an organization’s funds, it 
regulates the organization’s ability to hire an attorney by requiring it 
to apply for and receive approval for a specific license to pay 
attorneys’ fees from the frozen funds.  However, after sanctions are in 
place, the considerations that justified postponing notice and a 
hearing are insufficient to justify preventing an organization from 
obtaining a meaningful hearing on the issue of attorneys’ fees.  Part B 
of this section weighs these interests to show that the current process 
inadequately protects the organization’s interest in hiring an attorney 
and determines that due process requires a more meaningful hearing 
once an organization’s assets are frozen and are no longer available 
to be used for illegitimate purposes. 
A. Due Process Does Not Require Prior Notice or Hearing Before Freezing an 
Organization’s Assets 
Although the constitutional norm is to provide prior notice and a 
hearing before seizing private assets,99 an application of the Mathews 
test to the OFAC sanctioning process shows that the extraordinary 
circumstances present in cases involving the designation and 
investigation of SDGTs warrant postponement of notice and a 
hearing.100 
First, the test considers the private interest at stake.101  Here, a 
sanctioned organization has a private property interest in accessing 
its assets similar to that of the property owner in United States v. James 
                                                          
 99. Global Relief II, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. 
James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (“We tolerate some exceptions 
to the general rule requiring pre-deprivation notice and hearing, but only in 
extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake . . . .”). 
 100. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974) 
(allowing postponement of notice and hearing under extraordinary circumstances). 
 101. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
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Daniel Good Real Property,102 who had an interest in accessing and 
exerting control over his home,103 or the yacht owner in Calero-Toledo 
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,104 who had an interest in retaining his 
yacht.105  Although the organization’s assets are arguably temporarily 
restrained, the private interest in accessing such assets is enough to 
require due process protection,106 and even a temporary deprivation 
of access may result in a permanent deprivation of an organization’s 
right to timely access to counsel, which is essential to due process.107  
Yet, the interest in accessing property, and even the important 
interest in hiring legal representation, are easily distinguished from 
the more significant liberty interests of the defendants in United States 
v. Moya-Gomez108 or United States v. Monsanto,109 where the courts 
permitted post-seizure notice and hearings even though the 
defendants faced possible imprisonment and sought the release of 
their assets to finance their criminal defense.110 
Second, the Mathews test considers the likelihood of erroneous 
deprivation.111  Here, the use of classified information and lack of 
judicial oversight of OFAC’s decision to impose sanctions on an 
organization introduce a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation 
similar to the risk inherent in ex parte proceedings authorizing the 
restraint of criminal defendants’ assets, such as in Moya-Gomez112 and 
Monsanto.113  In Moya-Gomez, the court expressly criticized the use of ex 
                                                          
 102. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 43 (1993). 
 103. See id. at 53–54 (arguing that the right to maintain control over the home and 
to be free of governmental interference is a private interest of historic importance). 
 104. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 663. 
 105. See id. at 677 n.12 (debating whether the yacht owner had a property interest 
in receiving rent from yacht or in possession of yacht). 
 106. See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that even though a defendant’s property may be returned to him at a later time, a 
deprivation has occurred). 
 107. See Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (stressing that in the American legal system, which is complex and highly 
adversarial, the denial of prompt access to counsel equates to the denial of the most 
fundamental elements of justice); see also Mosley v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 
945 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The right to the advice and assistance of retained counsel in 
civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process . . . .”). 
 108. 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 109. Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1186. 
 110. See id. at 1194, 1197 (acknowledging criminal defendant’s important liberty 
interest in obtaining his counsel of choice and the negative impact of restraining 
assets necessary to obtain legal counsel); Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 726 (recognizing 
criminal defendant’s important interest in retaining counsel in a timely manner and 
the difficulty in staging a criminal defense without the benefit of counsel). 
 111. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
 112. See 860 F.2d at 727–28 (describing forfeiture statute as authorizing a court to 
issue a restraining order for a defendant’s property based on an ex parte indictment). 
 113. See 924 F.2d at 1195 (arguing that the inherent risk in allowing the 
deprivation in ex parte proceedings accounts for the general rule that a prior 
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parte proceedings to issue restraining orders based on the potential 
for government abuse and their failure to allow the defendant an 
opportunity to challenge the government’s allegation that the assets 
are subject to forfeiture.114  Despite these flaws, the courts determined 
that the post-seizure notice did not violate the defendants’ due 
process.115  In contrast, the court in James Daniel Good determined that 
this high risk of erroneous deprivation in an ex parte proceeding was 
too great to justify postponing notice and a hearing until after seizing 
the defendant’s real property.116  Here, the use of classified evidence 
and the lack of judicial oversight for the imposition of sanctions 
create additional risks above those present in any of those cases.117  
However, this risk alone does not determine whether the process is 
constitutional; all three Mathews factors must be considered before 
drawing a conclusion.118 
The third factor weighing in the Mathews analysis is government 
interest.119  In the criminal forfeiture cases, the government interests 
were similar—enforcing drug laws, preventing criminals from 
benefiting from illegal acts, and decreasing the economic power of 
organized crime.120  Although those interests are valid and important, 
the government interests in preventing organizations from funding 
terrorism and minimizing transactions with SDGTs carry far more 
weight.121  In Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. 
                                                                                                                                      
adversary hearing is required before depriving a defendant of property when no 
special circumstances justify postponing the hearing). 
 114. See 860 F.2d at 728–29 (7th Cir. 1988) (insisting that the validity of a statutory 
scheme cannot depend on the expectation that the government would not abuse its 
statutory authority). 
 115. See, e.g., Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1192 (conceding that extraordinary 
circumstances justified the absence of a pre-restraining order hearing); Moya-Gomez, 
860 F.2d at 731 (postponing notice and hearing until after seizure contingent on 
immediate, post-restraint hearing). 
 116. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) 
(contending that immediate seizure was unnecessary because real property cannot 
be absconded and the court’s jurisdiction can be preserved without prior seizure). 
 117. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 
196–97 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (pointing out that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act does not forbid the use of third-hand accounts, press stories, Internet 
sources, or other hearsay from being included as part of the foundation for an 
organization’s designation and that the organization is not allowed to see or 
comment on any classified information used against it); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 
6, at 137 (criticizing OFAC procedure for its reliance on informal distribution of 
notices and regulations); Roth et al., supra note 28, at 78 (describing designation of 
organization based on one-page memo and decision by Treasury officials). 
 118. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 54–55 (enforcing laws); Monsanto, 924 F.2d 
at 1192 (decreasing the power of organized crime); Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 726, 729 
(protecting the government’s case in racketeering and narcotics trafficking cases). 
 121. See Global Relief II, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (equating government 
interest with preventing use of funds for violent acts that would lead to loss of life); 
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Ashcroft122 and Global Relief Foundation v. O’Neill,123 the courts 
specifically emphasized the importance of these interests and 
permitted OFAC to issue post-designation notice and opportunity for 
written response.124 
The consequences of providing prior notice and a hearing to a 
sanctioned organization are analogous to those in the Calero-Toledo 
yacht forfeiture case where the Court determined that post-seizure 
notice and hearing were permissible based on three factors:  (1) the 
seizure was necessary to secure an important government or general 
public interest, (2) the important government interest necessitated 
prompt action, and (3) the state exercised strict control over the 
government’s monopoly of legitimate force by restricting who may 
authorize seizure and the circumstances under which seizure may 
occur.125  First, the Court reasoned that the government’s interests in 
asserting in rem jurisdiction over the property and beginning 
forfeiture proceedings were important in protecting the public’s 
interest in preventing continued use of the property for illicit 
activities and in enforcing criminal sanctions.126  Here, the 
government has a similar interest in preventing assets from 
contributing to the continued perpetration of terrorist acts.127  
Second, prompt action in Calero-Toledo was necessary because the 
yacht easily could have been transferred, destroyed, or sequestered 
before the government could seize it.128  Similarly, financial assets are 
easily transferred or destroyed and prior notice of a freeze would give 
an organization the opportunity to take such action.129  Third, the 
Court reasoned that the government had sufficiently limited the use 
of its seizure authority because the officials making seizure decisions 
were not self-interested private parties and Puerto Rico law limited 
                                                                                                                                      
Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 208 (conceding that national security 
and carrying out foreign policy are important government interests); see generally 
Broxmeyer, supra note 18, at 471 (discussing government interest in combating 
terrorism through the use of economic sanctions). 
 122. 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 123. 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 124. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d at 163 (affirming district court decision approving 
process allowing for written response to OFAC designation and not requiring judicial 
hearing); Global Relief II, 315 F.3d at 754 (permitting post-designation notice despite 
the increased risk of erroneous deprivation). 
 125. 416 U.S. 663, 678–79 (1974). 
 126. Id. at 679. 
 127. See Gouvin, supra note 50, at 962 (comparing previous money-laundering laws 
designed to trace proceeds of crime with terrorism laws geared toward preventing 
the financing of terrorist acts). 
 128. 416 U.S. at 679. 
 129. See Broxmeyer, supra note 18, at 474–75 (arguing that pre-designation notice 
would thwart the government interests and that exigent circumstances justify 
postponing notice). 
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the government’s authority to make such seizures.130  Similarly, OFAC 
officials do not personally benefit from the asset freezes they 
implement, and the scope of the freezes is limited.131 
Finally, if the extraordinary circumstances in Calero-Toledo justified 
postponing notice and a hearing,132 then the national emergency 
preceding OFAC’s authority to impose sanctions provides more than 
sufficient justification for postponing notice and a hearing until after 
sanctions are in place.133  Although a sanctioned organization has a 
substantial interest in accessing its assets, and post-sanction notice 
and an opportunity to respond creates a high risk of erroneous 
deprivation—especially in light of the use of classified evidence—the 
government interest in preventing the transfer of funds before 
sanctions are in place outweighs these considerations and justifies the 
use of post-seizure notice.134  
B. After Freezing an Organization’s Assets, Due Process Requires a Timely 
and Adversarial Hearing 
Although due process does not require pre-sanction notice and a 
hearing, due process does require OFAC to provide sanctioned 
organizations with a prompt and adversarial post-sanction hearing.135  
Current OFAC regulations allow an organization to submit a written 
response to the designation decision and to provide evidence in its 
defense.136  Similarly, the regulations allow an organization to submit 
a written request for a license authorizing the release of assets to pay 
for attorneys’ fees.137  However, a Mathews analysis demonstrates that 
                                                          
 130. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679. 
 131. See Exec. Order No. 13,244, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (vesting 
power to impose financial sanctions in Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of State, and 
Attorney General); Keeney, supra note 6, at 302–07 (arguing that asset freezes keep 
assets untouched in accounts and make frozen funds virtually inaccessible to any 
entity making claim to the funds).  But see Lehrer, supra note 5, at 335 (criticizing the 
asset freezing process for placing too much discretion in the executive to keep funds 
frozen indefinitely). 
 132. 416 U.S. at 679. 
 133. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 163, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (claiming that a national 
emergency justifies post-designation notice even though the court had not allowed 
post-designation notice in instances where the President had not declared a national 
emergency). 
 134. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550–52 (1965) (establishing that due 
process notice requirements depend on the circumstances at hand). 
 135. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (“[W]ritten submissions do 
not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to 
mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as 
important.”), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1996). 
 136. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d at 164 (reiterating that due process does not 
require OFAC to provide a designated organization post-designation judicial trial on 
merits of decision). 
 137. 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b)(2)–(3) (2007). 
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such procedures cannot adequately protect an organization’s interest 
in securing the release of portions of its assets for the purpose of 
hiring an attorney.138 
First, a sanctioned organization not only has an interest in access to 
its resources for the purpose of paying rent, salaries, and other daily 
expenses, but also it must hire an attorney to assist the organization 
in determining what rights it has while sanctioned and to represent 
the organization in its dealings with OFAC.139  A sanctioned 
organization’s interest in obtaining legal counsel exceeds the mere 
property interest of the defendant in Calero-Toledo, where the Court 
noted that the post-seizure notice did not violate due process where 
the statute provided the injured party with an opportunity to 
challenge the seizure in an immediate post-seizure hearing.140  The 
interest in timely access to counsel is more analogous to the 
defendants’ qualified right to obtain their counsel of choice in Moya-
Gomez and Monsanto, where the courts required an immediate post-
restraint adversary hearing to establish that the government had 
probable cause to believe that the defendants’ assets were subject to 
forfeiture.141  Although a criminal defendant’s interest in obtaining 
counsel is arguably more compelling than that of a sanctioned 
organization not subject to criminal charges, in both cases the 
consequences of being unable to obtain counsel are permanent and 
more severe than the simple deprivation of property in Calero-
Toledo.142  Deprivation of the right to obtain counsel is also more 
permanent than the deprivation of a home, such as in James Daniel 
Good, where the Court determined that the property interest at stake 
was so important that due process required an adversarial hearing 
prior to seizing the defendant’s home.143 
                                                          
 138. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).  But see Broxmeyer, supra 
note 18, at 479–81 (claiming that a designated organization requires only limited 
arguments and evidence to rebut evidence supporting a designation and that face-to-
face confrontation is unnecessary in most cases). 
 139. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270–71 (recognizing that an attorney may best 
protect a party’s interests); Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasizing the importance of legal counsel in helping a party 
ascertain its rights). 
 140. See 416 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1974) (explaining that the statute authorizing the 
seizure provided for a challenge to the action within fifteen days). 
 141. United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that 
without a pretrial hearing to contest the restraint of assets needed to hire counsel, 
the defendant is irrevocably deprived of that counsel); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 
860 F.2d 706, 726 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The defendant needs the attorney now if the 
attorney is to do him any good.”). 
 142. See 416 U.S. at 679 (analyzing whether circumstances justified depriving 
owner of property interest without prior notice). 
 143. See 510 U.S. 43, 58, 61–63 (1993) (rejecting the argument that a seizure is 
valid because the claimant was convicted of the crime in question at the time of the 
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Second, the license application process, through which an 
organization may request access to its assets in order to pay an 
attorney, does not provide an organization with a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard and subjects the organization to an 
unacceptable level of risk of erroneous deprivation.144  Like the risks 
created by the ex parte proceedings that the Court criticized as 
providing little or no protection to the claimant in James Daniel 
Good,145 the license application process fails to protect an 
organization’s right to obtain counsel because it does not provide the 
organization with an opportunity to respond to OFAC’s objections to 
its request and does not submit the application to a judicial officer 
for review.146  In Moya-Gomez,147 the court even noted that a statutory 
scheme permitting the government to seize assets on the basis of an 
ex parte application to a grand jury presented a great opportunity for 
government abuse of its power and significantly impeded the 
defendant’s ability to participate in the adversary process.148 
Not only does the application process introduce an unacceptable 
risk of error because OFAC is the sole reviewer and decision maker, 
the process also increases the risk of error because OFAC regulations 
fail to provide organizations with information on how to successfully 
obtain a license.149  OFAC’s use of classified information in making 
the decision to impose sanctions on an organization, and likely in 
deciding whether to approve license requests, further increases the 
risk of erroneous deprivation.150  The little available guidance on the 
                                                                                                                                      
seizure and had adequate opportunity to challenge the seizure).  Here, the 
organization has not even been subjected to criminal charges. 
 144. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b)(2)–(3) (2007) (outlining procedures for license 
applications, but not delineating criteria by which licenses are approved or 
timeframe in which decision will be made); see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269 (“In 
almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process 
requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”), 
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1996). 
 145. See 510 U.S. at 55–56 (scrutinizing the seizure procedures that allow a 
magistrate judge to issue a warrant of seizure without considering defenses to the 
government’s position). 
 146. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b)(2)–(3) (establishing that an organization may 
request a license and, upon denial, request an explanation, not reconsideration of 
the same request). 
 147. 860 F.2d 706, 728 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 148. See id. (reiterating the importance of the adversary process in ensuring the 
integrity of the truth-finding process). 
 149. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 131 (observing that OFAC has a habit 
of providing little guidance on how to challenge decisions or how to obtain a 
license). 
 150. See Broxmeyer, supra note 18, at 484 (examining the use of classified evidence 
in making designations without disclosing that information to designated 
organizations and the insurmountable obstacle that the use of such information 
creates for a party attempting to prove its innocence). 
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issue nevertheless establishes that designations may rely on less 
reliable evidence than is required in criminal or civil trials because 
the power to impose these economic sanctions is derived from the 
Executive’s war and foreign policy powers, to which courts give great 
deference.151  For example, designations may be based on intelligence 
data, but they may also be based on hearsay, which is not admissible 
as evidence in civil or criminal cases.152  No matter how important the 
government interest at stake is, an organization is guaranteed a 
meaningful hearing before being deprived of a liberty or property 
interest.153 
The third factor in the Mathews test considers the government 
interest at stake and the increased burden of imposing additional 
procedural safeguards.154  Here, not only is OFAC working to control 
assets and prevent enemy aliens from using them to commit acts of 
terrorism, but it is also responding to a national emergency declared 
in response to a terrorism threat.155  The government interest in this 
instance is more important than the government interests in 
recovering assets from a suspected or convicted criminal for the 
purpose of preventing a criminal from continuing to control “ill-
gotten” assets, obtaining funds for law enforcement, restoring 
ownership to the rightful owners, and minimizing the power of 
organized crime.156 
But unlike criminal defendants subject to asset restraints, 
sanctioned organizations are requesting access to legitimate funds, 
such as those used to purchase items for charitable programs.157  The 
                                                          
 151. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(referring to OFAC decisions as an intersection of national security, foreign policy, 
and administrative law and acknowledging an extremely deferential standard of 
review). 
 152. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (observing that the 
government may make designations based on a broad range of evidence, including 
hearsay); see also Peter Whoriskey, Mistrial Declared in Islamic Charity Case, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 23, 2007, at A3 (quoting juror as saying he thought all of the defendants were 
innocent because the prosecution had so little evidence). 
 153. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“Even the war power 
does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.”); Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (insisting that due process protects aliens as well as citizens in times of 
peace as well as in times of trouble). 
 154. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
 155. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d at 163–64 (describing the interests under 
consideration as encompassing more than traditional “legal interests”) (quoting 
Global Relief II, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 156. See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing 
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629–30 (1989)) (listing 
the government interests that may be served by seizing assets). 
 157. See id. (noting that the government interest in removing the defendant’s 
assets from his control is based on a claim that the government has a higher right to 
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organizations are requesting access to funds that were not obtained 
through illegal means, such as drug trafficking or selling counterfeit 
wares,158 and depriving organizations of assets compiled through 
legitimate means for a potentially illegitimate purpose does not serve 
the government’s interest in teaching criminals that “crime doesn’t 
pay.”159 
Further distinguishing sanctioned organizations from the parties in 
Calero-Toledo or Monsanto, where the courts recognized that notice 
prior to freezing the parties’ assets would likely prevent the 
government from recovering the assets,160 additional procedural 
safeguards are unlikely to subvert the government’s ability to control 
and regulate an organization’s assets.161 
OFAC currently orchestrates the release of assets upon grant of a 
license to a sanctioned organization.162  Substituting an adversarial 
hearing for the written license application and approval process 
would increase OFAC’s administrative burden, but the sanctioned 
organization’s interest in a meaningful opportunity to be heard and 
in obtaining timely legal representation justifies imposing such a 
burden.163  In United States v. Farmer,164 the court determined that any 
additional administrative burdens would be justified because they 
                                                                                                                                      
those assets because they were obtained through illegal means); see also Caplin & 
Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 629–30 (illustrating the government’s various superior claims to 
assets procured through criminal action, such as to use the assets for law 
enforcement efforts and to return the assets to the rightful owners who lost the assets 
due to the illegal acts). 
 158. See United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 801–02 (4th Cir. 2001) (reviewing 
claim of defendant who claimed that the government seized legitimate assets as well 
as those obtained through trademark and money laundering violations); Monsanto, 
924 F.2d at 1189–90 (conceding strong government interest in recovering all 
forfeitable assets allegedly obtained through narcotics trafficking and other illegal 
activities). 
 159. If assets are not used for illegitimate purpose or procured through 
illegitimate or fraudulent activities, then the government has no superior claim to 
such assets.  See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626 (citing the rule that constitutional 
right to counsel only affords criminal defendants the right to use legitimate funds to 
hire an attorney); Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1192 (arguing that the government has a 
higher claim to the assets because they were illegally obtained). 
 160. See Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1192 (determining that postponing notice and 
hearing was necessary to protect government interest in preventing disposal of assets 
in anticipation of forfeiture); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663, 679 (1974) (observing that advance warning would likely result in 
destruction, concealment, or transfer of the property). 
 161. See discussion supra Part III.B (addressing OFAC control of sanctioned 
organization’s assets). 
 162. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801 (2007) (establishing application process for licenses); 
31 C.F.R. § 585.506 (2007) (authorizing payment of attorneys’ fees after grant of 
license). 
 163. See Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (referring to prompt access to counsel as essential to obtaining justice). 
 164. 274 F.3d 800 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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would be based on genuine need and would not be frivolous claims.165  
Similarly, in Moya-Gomez the court determined that an additional 
administrative burden was justified as long as those who sought 
adversarial hearings had no other assets with which to hire counsel.166  
Here, where OFAC has the power to control all of a sanctioned 
organization’s assets and financial transactions, such an organization 
has a bona fide need for access to a portion of its assets and approval 
to use them to pay an attorney.167 
Similar to a criminal defendant who suffers a permanent 
deprivation of the right to counsel if not permitted a meaningful 
opportunity to contest the restraint of assets necessary to obtain 
counsel,168 a sanctioned organization suffers a permanent deprivation 
of its right to obtain counsel and is likely to suffer other permanent 
losses, such as closing its business and incurring debt as a result.169  In 
Moya-Gomez, the court went so far as to say that if the government was 
unwilling to provide an adversarial hearing to a defendant in order to 
establish the likelihood that the defendant’s assets were subject to 
forfeiture, then the government had to consent to the exemption of 
reasonable attorneys’ fees if the defendant had no other assets with 
which to hire an attorney.170  Although a sanctioned organization is 
not confronting the possibility of imprisonment, the organization is 
likely to lose its business and its reputation, and multiple individuals 
are likely to lose their source of income.171  An organization has a 
right to challenge the process responsible for inflicting such injuries 
                                                          
 165. See id. at 805 (reasoning that the court’s holding would not result in 
numerous hearings based on flimsy or insubstantial grounds and that government 
admitted it did not oppose hearing for Farmer if he demonstrated that he was 
unable to hire an attorney). 
 166. See 860 F.2d 706, 730 (7th Cir. 1988) (limiting the holding to require the 
government to prove the likelihood that the restrained assets are subject to forfeiture 
in cases where defendant demonstrates bona fide need for restrained assets to 
conduct defense). 
 167. See Lehrer, supra note 5, at 337 (describing OFAC control over frozen assets 
as prohibiting payment, withdrawal, or transfer of financial property without a 
treasury license). 
 168. See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1195 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that a pre-trial adversary hearing can play an important role in ensuring that the 
deprivation has sufficient factual foundation). 
 169. See Engel, supra note 4, at 283 (summarizing effect of OFAC sanctions as 
shutting down three charitable organizations and potentially confiscating good-faith 
donations). 
 170. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 731. 
 171. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(reviewing challenge by organization that OFAC designated and sanctioned in 2004 
where OFAC refused to release funds for the payment of attorneys’ fees and 
organization was forced to challenge designation and seek release of funds without 
paying an attorney), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 92 (2007); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 6, 
at 77 (“After twenty five years of operations as a U.S. company, producing annual 
revenues of up to $50 million dollars, IPT was out of business.”). 
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and can only do so in a meaningful manner if permitted to hire an 
attorney.172  Such an important interest warrants the additional 
burden of allowing a sanctioned organization a post-deprivation 
adversary hearing to determine whether it has a right to the release of 
funds to pay attorneys’ fees. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Amending the Process to Include an Administrative Hearing on the Issue 
of Attorneys’ Fees 
The inadequacies in the current OFAC licensing process could be 
solved by implementing an automatic administrative hearing to 
determine whether an organization should be permitted to access 
funds for the purpose of paying reasonable attorneys’ fees.  Although 
courts have held that due process does not require OFAC to provide 
a sanctioned organization with procedures approximating a judicial 
trial when the organization challenges its designation,173 those courts 
did not discuss the issue of attorneys’ fees.  In criminal cases involving 
restraints on assets, such as Moya-Gomez and Monsanto, the courts have 
determined that the defendant’s interest in obtaining counsel in a 
timely manner is so great that it requires a pre-trial adversary hearing 
to establish probable cause for the forfeiture of the defendant’s 
assets.174  These cases restrict the need for an adversary hearing to 
situations where the defendant has demonstrated a bona fide need to 
use restrained assets to hire an attorney—in other words, the restraint 
has rendered the defendant indigent.175  Sanctioned organizations are 
essentially rendered indigent by OFAC sanctions.176  Although OFAC 
provides sanctioned organizations with the option of requesting 
licenses to conduct certain transactions, such a slow and complex 
                                                          
 172. See Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(construing due process law as requiring access to counsel to meaningfully 
participate in administrative proceedings because of the complex nature of the 
American legal system); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 111–16 (describing OFAC 
as fostering an adversarial relationship with the trading community, being 
unconcerned about customer service, implementing regulations after long delays, 
and adhering to informal procedures). 
 173. See, e.g., Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (arguing that a 
designated organization has no right to confront and cross-examine witnesses where 
designation is based on Executive Order 13,224). 
 174. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 730; see United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 
1196 (2d Cir. 1991) (equating deprivation of a pre-trial adversary hearing allowing 
defendant to challenge restraint of assets needed to retain counsel with deprivation 
of counsel). 
 175. Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1193; Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 730. 
 176. See discussion supra Part III.B (addressing OFAC control of sanctioned 
organization’s assets). 
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process does not sufficiently address the organizations’ immediate 
need to hire counsel.177  However, the differences in circumstances 
between a criminal defendant and a sanctioned organization do 
justify providing sanctioned organizations with less than a full judicial 
adversary hearing.178 
A sanctioned organization’s need to hire an attorney to protect its 
legal rights while subject to sanctions is arguably less imperative than 
that of a criminal defendant faced with trial.179  However, a sanctioned 
organization has more at stake than a simple property interest, which 
is what courts have focused on when determining what type of 
hearing due process requires the government to provide to 
sanctioned organizations challenging the designation process.180  In 
reaching its decision that a written opportunity to challenge the 
administrative record prior to designation would satisfy due process, 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals focused the majority of its 
consideration on when OFAC must provide a hearing rather than 
what form the hearing must take.181  In light of the potential for an 
organization to lose its capacity to operate its business and suffer 
financial hardship, such cursory consideration seems insufficient 
when compared to the serious consideration courts have given to 
other similar, but perhaps less substantial, losses, such as employment 
or utility services.182 
                                                          
 177. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(requesting release of funds for attorneys’ fees after more than two years of litigating 
without access to funds), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 92 (2007); see also Fitzgerald, supra 
note 6, at 116 (citing one occasion where OFAC took two years to respond to a 
license request). 
 178. Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1192; see Broxmeyer, supra note 18, at 477–80 (arguing 
that a written response to OFAC designation would suffice under normal 
circumstances, but an oral hearing could be necessary to provide additional 
testimony  where determination hinges on credibility). 
 179. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (recognizing that due 
process requires a criminal defendant to have legal representation because requiring 
a defendant to face trial without representation would be inherently unjust). 
 180. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reasoning that 
opportunity to present written opposition to designation prior to restraint of funds 
satisfied due process); see also Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, 251 F.3d 192, 204–05 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (declining to consider violation of Fifth 
Amendment right of liberty because Fifth Amendment provided due process 
protection of property rights). 
 181. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d at 163 (allowing post-designation notice and written 
opportunity to respond based on reasoning from Nat’l Council of Resistance); Nat’l 
Council of Resistance, 251 F.3d at 196, 208–09 (reasoning that due process required at 
least prior opportunity to respond where statute provided for judicial review by 
request if organization made request within thirty days of publication of designation 
under AEDPA). 
 182. See Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) 
(affording a face-to-face hearing where a recipient faced termination of utilities); 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) (holding that due process required an 
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For example, when the government revokes a private employee’s 
security clearance, and the deprivation results in that employee’s 
inability to secure subsequent similar employment, the government 
may not deprive the employee of his security clearance in a 
proceeding that does not provide the safeguards of confrontation 
and cross-examination.183  Similarly, the government may not deprive 
a government employee of his employment without a post-
termination administrative hearing.184  Even when a petitioner suffers 
deprivation of utility services, due process requires the utility to meet 
with the petitioner in person before cutting off services.185  Here, 
OFAC is not only depriving a sanctioned organization of its liberty to 
operate its business, but also, is depriving the organization of its more 
important right to hire legal counsel.186  If due process requires a 
utility  to meet in person with a customer before terminating the 
customer’s service, due process certainly requires OFAC to provide 
more substantial proceedings to an organization unable to access any 
of its assets, unable to operate its business, and, therefore, unable to 
hire an attorney.187 
In fact, a sanctioned organization’s losses are more analogous to 
those of the employee who loses his security clearance.188  In both 
cases, the information used in the decision-making process includes 
classified information and raises issues of national security.189  The 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that due process does 
not require the government to reveal to a designated organization 
                                                                                                                                      
adversarial hearing where a private employee was deprived of a security clearance 
necessary to obtain his employment of choice). 
 183. See Greene, 360 U.S. at 508 (reasoning that when the type of hearing is 
determined by administrative decision and not explicitly authorized by the President 
or Congress, the Court assumes that Congress or the President would have intended 
to provide the petitioner with the traditional safeguards of due process). 
 184. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546–47 (1985) 
(holding that an Ohio statute afforded due process because it required that 
termination procedures provide employees with pre-termination opportunity for 
written response and post-termination administrative hearing). 
 185. See Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 18 (recognizing utility service as a necessity of 
modern life). 
 186. See Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(describing as “undeniable” the right of private parties to hire an attorney in order to 
determine their legal rights (citing Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 
1982))).  In Martin, the court considered the right to hire an attorney to be 
connected to the fundamental right of meaningful access to courts.  686 F.2d at 32. 
 187. Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 18. 
 188. See Greene, 360 U.S. at 492 (noting the use of classified information and 
testimony of witnesses not present at a proceeding to determine whether to revoke 
security clearance privileges). 
 189. See id. at 494 (describing hearing procedures as designed to protect national 
security); Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (referring to risk that 
foreign terrorists would have an interest in frozen assets). 
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the classified information used in making its designation, but a judge 
may review such information in camera during a judicial designation 
challenge.190  It follows that any hearing on the release of assets for 
the purpose of hiring an attorney would not require the government 
to disclose classified information.191 
However, due process does require a hearing before a third-party 
reviewer during which a sanctioned organization has the opportunity 
to present evidence supporting its need for access to its funds and to 
rebut in person any opposing unclassified information or 
testimony.192  In the administrative proceeding determining whether 
the government could properly revoke an employee’s security 
clearance, the Court determined that traditional due process 
safeguards applied.193 And in criminal cases where the defendant has 
the benefit of the Rules of Evidence,194 courts have insisted that due 
process requires a pre-trial adversary hearing for defendants who 
need to access restrained assets in order to hire their attorney of 
choice.195  Although a sanctioned organization is not facing imminent 
imprisonment, the use of classified information and the non-
conformity with the Rules of Evidence when compiling evidence 
against an organization raise additional issues of fairness that demand 
additional procedural safeguards to protect an organization’s right to 
hire an attorney.196  An impartial administrative hearing during which 
                                                          
 190. See Holy Land II, 333 F.3d at 164 (“The IEEPA expressly authorizes ex parte 
and in camera review of classified information in ‘any judicial review of a 
determination made under this section [that] was based on classified information.’” 
(citing 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c))); see also Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t 
of State, 251 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (admitting that the United States has a 
privilege in classified information such that even a criminal defendant cannot seek 
disclosure of the information for his defense without a specific showing of 
materiality). 
 191. See Greene, 360 U.S. at 508 (implying that with specific authorization from the 
President or Congress, administrative hearings that do not require the government 
to disclose the classified information upon which it made its decision may be lawful). 
 192. See Nat’l Council of Resistance, 251 F.3d at 208 (questioning the ability of 
various members of the Executive Branch to substitute their judgment for the 
requirements of due process). 
 193. Greene, 360 U.S. at 508. 
 194. Designations may rely on less evidence than is required in criminal or civil 
trials because the power to impose economic sanctions is derived from the 
Executive’s war and foreign policy powers, to which courts give great deference.  See 
Holy Land II, 333 F.3d at 162 (observing that the government may make designations 
based on a broad range of evidence, including hearsay); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 
6, at 139 (including judicial deference to executive and legislative foreign policy 
decisions in the list of challenges organizations face when attempting to challenge 
OFAC decisions). 
 195. United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1203 (2d Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 731 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 196. See Nat’l Council of Resistance, 251 F.3d at 196–200 (illustrating court’s inability 
to provide facts of case in opinion because of substantial use of classified information 
and pointing out sanctioned organization’s inability to review or comment on 
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the organization may submit evidence supporting its need for 
immediate release of funds for the purpose of hiring an attorney 
would provide sufficient safeguards without imposing the 
administrative burden of a full judicial inquiry.197 
B. Providing Access to Assets for Payment of Attorneys’ Fees as a Matter of 
Course 
In the likely event that OFAC prefers not to provide sanctioned 
organizations with an administrative hearing, the court’s decision in 
Moya-Gomez suggests an alternative.198  The court stated that if, in the 
future, the government sought to restrain a defendant’s assets 
without providing a post-restraint adversarial hearing, then the court 
would order the release of reasonable attorneys’ fees without a 
hearing.199  Similarly, if OFAC does not provide sanctioned 
organizations with an automatic hearing to allow an organization to 
request the release of assets to pay attorneys’ fees, then OFAC should 
automatically allow sanctioned organizations to access reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.200  Just as due process requires a timely hearing on the 
release of funds to pay attorneys’ fees in criminal forfeiture 
proceedings,201 due process would require OFAC to release the funds 
in a timely manner.  Timing is of the essence because delays in access 
to counsel delay the organization’s ability to assess its rights and to 
defend against OFAC sanctions.202 
Of course, OFAC could not automatically release funds to 
sanctioned organizations without monitoring the use of the funds.203  
                                                                                                                                      
classified evidence); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972) (elaborating 
on the purpose of due process as to prevent arbitrary deprivation and ensure fair 
play). 
 197. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (considering administrative 
burden when determining what safeguards due process requires); see also Broxmeyer, 
supra note 18, at 481 (evaluating utility of providing oral hearing to organization 
challenging designation based on government interest in conserving fiscal and 
administrative resources). 
 198. See 860 F.2d at 731 (assuming implied government consent to release of 
reasonable attorneys’ fees when government has failed to provide adversary hearing 
and defendant has no other assets with which to hire an attorney). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 730–31 (agreeing with district court’s order to make available to 
defendant, from defendant’s seized funds, an amount the district court deemed 
necessary to hire a satisfactory attorney and leaving open the possibility of releasing 
further funds if the original estimate proved inadequate). 
 201. See id. at 726 (noting that, for a defendant, a temporary seizure of funds 
constitutes a permanent withholding as regards attorneys’ fees). 
 202. See discussion supra Part III.B (evaluating organization’s need for timely 
access to counsel). 
 203. The purpose of Executive Order 13,224 is to prevent terrorist financing, and 
the release of funds without monitoring would likely be contrary to this purpose 
because it would not ensure that the released funds were not transferred to terrorist 
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As discussed earlier, the government has a significant interest in 
preventing organizations from using assets to fund terrorist activities, 
and allowing an organization unconditional access to any amount of 
money could subvert this interest.204  Therefore, before releasing the 
funds, the organization would have to provide OFAC with 
information about who would provide legal services to the 
organization and what type of legal services the attorneys would 
provide.205  OFAC currently keeps records of such information and 
monitors attorney payments under its licensing program,206 so the 
process would not inflict any substantial additional burden on 
OFAC.207  The main distinctions between this automatic process and 
the current licensing process would be the strict timeline for release 
of the funds, and the underlying presumption that OFAC would 
release assets to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees to all organizations 
that provided OFAC with the information necessary to facilitate the 
monitoring of the use of the funds.208 
Another important distinction between the current licensing 
process and an automatic approval process would be the procedures 
that OFAC would have to follow in order to deny access to funds.209  
Currently, if OFAC denies a license request for access to funds to pay 
attorneys’ fees, OFAC does not have to provide the organization with 
an explanation for its decision.210  However, under the automatic 
approval process, OFAC would have to participate in an 
administrative hearing to review its decision to deny access to funds 
                                                                                                                                      
organizations rather than attorneys.  See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 
(Sept. 23, 2001) (deeming financial sanctions appropriate means to attack financial 
foundation of foreign terrorists). 
 204. See discussion supra Part III.A (surmising that risk of transfer or sequestration 
of funds justifies postponing notice of asset freeze). 
 205. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (detailing current license application process 
with similar requirements). 
 206. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.506 (2007) (restricting provision of attorneys’ fees to 
sanctioned organizations that are licensed). 
 207. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (recognizing importance of 
minimizing additional administrative burdens when implementing additional 
procedural safeguards). 
 208. See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 730 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (requesting organization denied access to funds for purpose of paying 
attorneys’ fees), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 92 (2007). 
 209. The important national security issues and foreign policy goals at stake 
mandate that OFAC have the power to deny access to funds under appropriate 
circumstances.  See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498, 505 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (deferring to OFAC’s licensing decision because interference would 
result in judicial interference in diplomacy); see also Lehrer, supra note 5, at 344 
(indicating that national security interests and foreign policy goals are primary 
considerations in OFAC regulations and that courts are hesitant to interfere with 
OFAC’s expertise in the area). 
 210. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b)(4) (2007) (permitting organization to request 
explanation for license application denial). 
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because OFAC’s decision would prevent an organization from 
obtaining legal representation and due process requires that the 
deprived party have an opportunity to challenge such a decision.211  
An independent reviewer could permit OFAC to deny access to funds 
if OFAC provided sufficient evidence of national security risks or 
interference with foreign policy goals, similar to the evidence 
necessary to justify postponing notice of designation as a foreign 
terrorist until after the designation is in place.212  In adopting this 
option, OFAC avoids the burden of an automatic administrative 
hearing to consider the release of attorneys’ fees, ensures access to 
counsel for sanctioned organizations, and still protects important 
national security and foreign policy interests.213 
C. Evaluating the Standard of Review when Denial of Access to Funds for 
Payment of Attorneys’ Fees Is at Issue 
Currently, if an organization is unable to obtain access to its assets 
for the purpose of paying attorneys’ fees, it must seek judicial 
review.214  However, judicial review of OFAC decisions is extremely 
deferential and OFAC decisions are overturned only when a court 
determines that the decision was arbitrary or capricious.215  Such a 
standard of review is essentially equivalent to the rational basis test 
that courts apply when considering the constitutionality of state 
action that infringes on non-fundamental rights.216  Under this 
standard the challenger has the burden of demonstrating that the 
                                                          
 211. See discussion supra Part III.B (concluding that due process requires OFAC to 
provide a sanctioned organization with an administrative hearing to determine 
whether funds should be released to pay attorneys’ fees). 
 212. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 
208 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (allowing postponement of notice of designation where early 
notification would interfere with national security or foreign policy goals). 
 213. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (recognizing significance 
of curtailing additional administrative burdens when implementing added 
procedural safeguards). 
 214. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(challenging district court decision upholding blocking of assets and refusing to 
allow amendment to complaint to request release of funds to pay attorneys’ fees), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 92 (2007). 
 215. Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 216. See id. at 162 (affirming district court review of OFAC decision that turned on 
whether agency’s decision was supported by a rational basis).  The traditional 
rational basis standard of review upholds government action if the action serves a 
legitimate governmental purpose and is rationally related to that purpose.  See, e.g., 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (striking down Colorado amendment 
on the ground that its purpose was discriminatory in nature, illegitimate, and 
violative of equal protection). 
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government has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and few 
parties successfully meet this burden.217 
Yet, courts apply essentially this same level of review when 
considering the constitutionality of OFAC decisions, even those that 
would interfere with an organization’s ability to hire an attorney.218  
Moreover, this deferential standard applies even though access to 
legal representation is inherently related to the organization’s right 
of access to the courts, which is a fundamental right.219  Actions that 
infringe on fundamental rights typically merit the highest standard of 
review—strict scrutiny—which permits government interference only 
when necessary to further a compelling governmental interest.220 
The contrast between these two standards simply shows that in a 
setting not governed by the APA standard, interference with a 
sanctioned organization’s right to hire an attorney might merit a 
more critical review.221  For example, if the government carried the 
burden of proof or the government’s actions were scrutinized more 
carefully, then a sanctioned organization’s right to hire an attorney 
would be more adequately protected.222  Instead, despite the 
important interest at stake, the current standard of review demands 
that the challenging organization prove that such a deprivation is 
                                                          
 217. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 620 (describing the rational basis test as 
deferential to the government and rarely the basis for holding laws 
unconstitutional). 
 218. See Lehrer, supra note 5, at 342–44 (commenting that OFAC licensing has 
instigated a good amount of litigation and that OFAC decisions garner even more 
deference than other administrative agencies). 
 219. The Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental right of access to the 
courts.  Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).  In Martin v. Lauer, the court 
determined that governmental interference with the attorney-client relationship 
implicated the plaintiffs’ right of access to the courts.  686 F.2d 24, 32 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 
1982).  A similar argument could be made for sanctioned organizations based on 
OFAC’s interference with an organization’s ability to pay an attorney, which 
inherently interferes with an organization’s ability to hire an attorney and adequately 
represent itself in court. 
 220. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (requiring the 
government to demonstrate that a governmental interest of overriding significance 
justifies denial of due process to people who are forced to settle claims in judicial 
proceedings); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 622, 815 (listing voting, access 
to the judicial process, and interstate travel as fundamental rights).  However, the 
Court has limited the right to counsel to non-discretionary proceedings.  Compare 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355–56 (1963) (holding that the government 
must provide an attorney to indigent defendants for initial appeals), with Ross v. 
Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974) (limiting government responsibility to appoint 
counsel only to appeals that the state is obligated to review). 
 221. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 620 (noting that critics of the inflexible 
levels of review advocate a sliding scale of review that takes into account factors such 
as constitutional and societal importance of the right negatively affected). 
 222. See Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 141 (addressing the heavy burden of 
persuasion that challengers bear when contesting OFAC decisions); Lehrer supra 
note 5, at 348 (describing challenging OFAC under current standards as an 
“insurmountable obstacle”). 
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unjustified.223  This burden, combined with the deference that courts 
grant to executive actions related to national security interests and 
foreign policy goals, makes challenging OFAC decisions essentially 
futile.224 
Implementation of a higher standard of review is unprecedented 
and likely to meet substantial resistance,225 especially in light of the 
well-settled administrative case law establishing the arbitrary and 
capricious standard.226  However, as increasing numbers of domestic 
charities face the challenge of hiring legal counsel while unable to 
access their assets, the courts will likely see more challenges to OFAC 
decisions and be forced to address the many due process issues that 
OFAC sanctions raise.227  Imposing a more critical standard of review 
in cases where attorneys’ fees are implicated could help reduce the 
number of due process challenges to OFAC decisions by serving as an 
incentive for OFAC to carefully manage the release and regulation of 
funds to pay attorneys’ fees, and by minimizing any undue 
interference with sanctioned organizations’ access to counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
OFAC’s current regulations do not adequately protect an 
organization’s right to hire an attorney because they allow OFAC to 
deprive an organization of its assets without providing a meaningful 
hearing to review requests for the release of funds to pay attorneys’ 
fees.  Although due process does not require pre-sanction notice and 
a hearing when considering government actions that restrict access to 
assets needed to pay attorneys’ fees, due process does require OFAC 
to provide sanctioned organizations with a timely administrative 
                                                          
 223. An organization is unlikely to succeed under such a burden, especially 
considering the limited information an organization has.  See Broxmeyer, supra note 
18, at 481–84 (evaluating the fairness of using classified information in making 
designations without disclosing the information to sanctioned organizations and 
observing that even the innocent would have difficulty obtaining justice when faced 
with confidential evidence); see also Lehrer, supra note 5, at 342 (suggesting that 
courts will decline to review OFAC licensing decisions unless OFAC has acted 
egregiously). 
 224. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 
207 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[N]o governmental interest is more compelling than the 
security of the nation.”). 
 225. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 620 (noting that the Supreme Court has 
been unwilling during recent years to impose strict or intermediate scrutiny review 
on additional classifications). 
 226. See, e.g., Holy Land II, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (acknowledging 
proper application of APA standard to Treasury Department decisions); Nat’l Council 
of Resistance, 251 F.3d at 199 (applying arbitrary and capricious standard to decision 
to designate National Council of Resistance as alias of another organization). 
 227. See Lehrer, supra note 5, at 360 (predicting increase in challenges to OFAC 
promulgations). 
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hearing after sanctions are in place.  Once sanctions are in place, the 
governmental interest in protecting national security and serving 
foreign policy objectives that justifies postponing notice and a 
hearing are less imperative, and the private interest in access to legal 
representation outweighs those concerns that would support denying 
sanctioned organizations an adversarial hearing. 
Access to legal counsel is essential for an organization attempting 
to determine its rights while subject to sanctions.  Implementing an 
automatic administrative hearing to determine an organization’s 
eligibility for access to funds would better safeguard its right to hire 
an attorney.  During the administrative hearing, an organization 
would not be allowed to view classified information, but would be 
permitted to submit evidence in favor of releasing funds for the 
purpose of hiring an attorney.  More importantly, a neutral 
decisionmaker would consider the evidence from both sides and 
determine whether reasonable attorneys’ fees should be released.  In 
camera and ex parte review of classified information, as well as public 
review of the administrative record, should be sufficient to support a 
decision to deny access to funds, and such a proceeding is unlikely to 
jeopardize foreign policy objectives. 
Alternatively, automatically releasing funds for the purpose of 
paying attorneys’ fees would provide better protection for a 
sanctioned organization’s right to hire an attorney.  This process 
would minimize additional administrative burden while ensuring that 
all sanctioned organizations have a fair opportunity to hire an 
attorney.  Under this procedure, OFAC would only have to provide 
the organization with a hearing related to the issue of releasing funds 
for attorneys’ fees if OFAC refused to automatically release the funds. 
Lastly, imposing a heightened standard of review or simply 
reviewing the government’s case more closely when considering 
decisions affecting an organization’s ability to hire an attorney would 
be a potential, though imperfect, way to ensure that an organization’s 
right to hire an attorney received the necessary due process 
protection.  Other alternatives are more practical and more likely to 
serve both governmental and private interests, but even this change 
would be an improvement on the current process. 
Although none of these alternatives is likely to be implemented in 
the near future, a change must be made.  The status quo is an 
unsatisfactory approach that allows the government to deprive a 
domestic organization of its business and property with very little due 
process.  The government imposes these penalties without filing 
criminal charges and without ever having a trial.  In order to 
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effectively challenge these actions, organizations, at the very least, 
need the ability to hire private attorneys.  Even though the current 
regulations provide a process through which organizations can 
attempt to gain access to funds for this purpose, this process fails to 
ensure that every organization that should be allowed to hire an 
attorney is able to do so and should be reformed. 
